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THE KOREAN WAR caused a sudden of American policy in 1950 with regard to Taiwa island a strategically important factor in the Un fense line in East Asia. The new era of vital interest in Taiwan inaugurated by this dramatic decision, however, only revived an ea but lesser-known interest fostered by American political milit strategists in World War II. During that period the United States formulated both a plan of conquest and a plan of occupation. A though neither program materialized, the military plan reveals importance attached to the island by American strategists dur World War II, while the occupation plan illustrates American off opinion concerning the Nationalist government at a time when government's prestige was waning. A study of the latter plan also r flects American views maintained by responsible officials in Wa ington regarding the prospects of future relations both with C in general and Taiwan in particular.
American concern for Taiwan was first stimulated by knowle of China's "sudden public interest" in the island shortly after Ja expansion of hostilities in the Pacific in December, 1941. China, til then, had no opportunity to regain control of Taiwan since cessi of the island to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, but involvement of the United States and Great Britain in the war in East Asia promptly stirred Chinese ambitions to regain it. The United States Ambassador to China, C. E. Gauss, reasoned that public atten tion regarding future Korean independence from Japanese domin tion gave direct impetus to China to initiate similar suggestion Taiwan "independence." 1 This would be accomplished by foste organizations advocating Taiwan's return to China and pub stressing "Chinese racial ties" with the island's population.
Agitation in China to free Taiwan first came from exiled Tai ese in 1941. Six Taiwanese organizations amalgamated into a "Ta revolutionary league" (Taiwan ko-ming t'ung-meng hui) wh claimed to have had 140,000 members-a highly unrealistic figur observers.2 The efforts of the organization were directed tow creation of a Taiwan army, establishment of a Taiwan prov government under the auspices of the Nationalist government, assurance of China's repossession of the island.3 While the leag was known to resort to espionage and terror, it was understo have enjoyed some support from the Kuomintang and the Chi Nationalist government.
By the summer of 1942 the Chinese had made known their officia terest in Taiwan and their expectations that it would revert to nese control. In conversation with an American diplomat, Dr.
Yun-chu, director of the Eastern Asiatic Affairs Departmen
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared that the return of wan was appropriate because its population was largely Chines maintained close relations with China.4 Before long, official s ment considering Taiwan as Chinese "irredenta" was expressed p U.S. Planning for Taiwan, 1942 Taiwan, -1945 licly. In May, 1943, Chungking's leading newspaper, Ta Kung Pao, asserted that Taiwan "must be returned unconditionally to China after the war" and refuted a suggestion by John K. Jessup, an American journalist, that Taiwan be placed under an "international mandate. " 5 As American representatives learned about the essentials of China's postwar planning, the return of Taiwan and other captured territories traditionally a part of China became an important assumption. Consequently, policy studies were soon being prepared in several American government agencies6 concerning various aspects of the island. In a lengthy and knowledgeable report made in the State Department's division of far eastern affairs, consideration of the independence of Taiwan was rejected, and its return to China was strongly supported.7 Taiwan in friendly hands could be commercially advantageous to the United States; but more important, Taiwan had great strategic value.8 It was more than a year later, however, before the question of Taiwan's postwar disposition received the attention of the highest echelons of American and British policy-makers. Without lengthy discussion or dispute, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's suggestion in March, 1943 , that Taiwan (and Manchuria) be returned to China was favorably received by Anthony Eden.9 Later in the year this view was to be reaffirmed during the international conferences at Cairo and Teheran.
In addition to future political interests, Taiwan was an islan posessing great strategic value for the wartime military plans of Japa and the allied powers. American Intelligence was fully cogniza that Taiwan served both as a base for military operations in south east Asia and the southwest Pacific and as an important unit i New York Times, May 16, 1943, 28:6; Sept. 15, 1943, 1:4. 6 In addition to USDS, government agencies preparing reports on Taiwan include Division of Military Intelligence of the War Department (a study of economic, politi social, and strategic aspects); Board of Economic Warfare (a study of social and e nomic factors, but primarily bombing objectives); and Office of the Coordinator Information. DS, Memorandum, J. E. Salisbury, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Fe 14, 1945 (894A.00). , "Formosa," Part I and II, Feb. 17, 1942 (894A.014/2). Part I unequivocally declared that "there is every reason, economi ethnical U.S. Planning for Taiwan, 1942 Taiwan, -1945 designated for return to China. Several days later, at Teheran, Marshall Joseph Stalin concurred in this decision. '6 While military strategy in the Pacific, ultimately to involve the seizure and occupation of Taiwan, was being refined in 1943, policy concerning political and administrative problems of occupation was also being formulated. In July and August, 1943, Country and Area committees (CAC) were established in the Department of State to prepare policy papers on postwar problems relative to the country or area concerned. In September, 1943, an area committee for the Far East" was approved, the "country" review not being considered feasible. Prominent members of the committee were Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, then political adviser in the Department of State, and Professor George H. Blakeslee in the division of territorial studies. They were assisted by specialists from the office of far eastern affairs, the division of territorial studies, and other units concerned with the Far East.s8
7DS, Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Intense study of occupation problems concerning Taiwan took place in the spring of 1944. It was made by the Department of State in response to over twenty basic questions posed in February by the civil affairs division of the War Department and the occupied areas section of the Navy Department.'9 Taiwan, of course, was only one aspect of the problem. The study made by the area committee on the Far East dealt with Japan proper and all areas occupied by Japan. While these country and area committees were in the process of formulation and busily engaged in preparing policy papers on occupation problems, a higher level unit was created to review and refine policy recommendations. This was the Postwar Programs Committee (PWC) which began early in 1944 and met periodically with the 16 The decision was reaffirmed once again at a subsequent meeting of the Pacific War Council (representatives of the allied nations fighting in the Pacific area) in Washington, D.C., Jan. 12, 1944 (ibid., 868; Herbert Feis, The China Tangle [Princeton, 1953] , 113). S17This has been identified variously as "Committee on the Far East," "Far East Area Committee," and the "Interdivisional Area Committee on the Far East" (Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939 [Washington, 1949 . The country and area committees were informally organized at first but became more formal by the end of the year when nine country committees and four area committees had been established. The area committee on the Far East was the most active, having met 221 times by the end of the war. Professor Hugh was also very active on the committee, normally acting as deputy to Blakeslee w was chairman.
19Ibid., 273. Hugh Borton, "United States Occupation Policies in Japan sin Surrender," Political Science Quarterly, LXII (1947) , 250. The request was made to
Office of Special Political Affairs, USDS, Feb. 18, 1944. secretary and undersecretary of state, assistant secretaries, vari political advisers, and other high officials.20 When the policy papers of the CAC were reviewed by the PW minor changes and additions were sometimes made.21 Later in year, the work of the PWC was superceded by various staff and coor nation committees. The CAC continued to function and remained the major working units through which "policy recommenda for current and emerging decisions were developed" for consid tion by high-level policy-makers.22
To co-ordinate government policies and the work of re agencies, a formal organization was established in December, called the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee (SWN Decisions of this body became government policy. In the follow month, on January 5, 1945 , this group formed a subcommittee on Far East. Representing the Department of State were Professors H Borton and Blakeslee, both senior members of the Far East section of the department's division of territorial studies and the area committee on the Far East. In its discussion of American postwar policy in the Far East, the subcommittee relied heavily on the papers prepared earlier by the CAC and modified by the PWC.23 Consequently, throughout the development of postwar policy concerning the Far East, the work undergone in the latter half of 1943 and the early half of 1944 by the area committee on the Far East represents the heart of American policy formulation for the postwar occupation.24
While policy plans were being devised, technical programs for civil administration in occupied areas were established, training schools for military personnel were instituted, and detailed manuals "0 I am indebted to Professor Philip E. Mosely, director of the European Institute at Columbia University, for clarification on this and other points (personal correspondence, Feb. 5, 1965) . 2The policy papers utilized for this article and frequently cited below were all the drafts of the combined efforts of both committees, enabling me to see each alteration in the various stages of development.
22 Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 368.
23Borton, "United States Occupation Policies in Japan," 250-251; Theodore H.
McNelly, Domestic and International Influences on Constitutional Revision in Japan, 1945 -1946 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Mich., 1952 The development of committees to formulate postwar policy for the Pacific area is succinctly traced by Borton in his paper, Preparation for the Occupation of Japan, presented at the American Historical Association meeting, Washington, D.C., Dec. 29, 1964, MS, 3-7 . Borton confirms that "many of the same persons worked on the same policy problems as they progressed from the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East" to higher-level committees. See also Borton's briefer version, "Preparation for Specific arrangements for training personnel for the anticipated occupation of Taiwan, however, were not made until summer, 1944.
At that time the navy was given the responsibility to plan and administer the civil affairs of Taiwan during the occupation, but it was expected that the army would provide the largest number of trained personnel. Their training would be given jointly in a ninety-day school for military government at Princeton University scheduled to begin October 1, 1944.27 Since strategic concerns ultimately discarded military plans for the conquest of Taiwan, the proposals of the CAC never required consideration by the state-war-navy co-ordinating committee, nor did implementation of a program for the occupation of Taiwan by trained civil affairs officers ever take place. Nevertheless, the policy proposals of the CAC reflect importantly upon the tenor of opinion and analysis in the Department of State by policy-makers concerned with China, and more specifically, Taiwan. In retrospect, some of the problems raised at that time have become the origins of long-standing postwar issues, still unsettled. Attached to the school at Columbia was a research center created to prepare handbooks, maps, and other training materials for both the military and civil aspects of the operation; see Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, [29] [30] 30 (fn.) . 27 All of the enlisted personnel and 80 per cent of the officers were to come from the army and 20 per cent of the officers from the navy. Naval personnel were to be utilized especially in functions requiring their technical naval background, such as in harbors. The various policy proposals formulated by the area commit the Far East can be grouped into six major areas of interest: ( sponsibility for the occupation, (2) transference of sovereignt American bases, (4) administrative policy, (5) status of Japane Taiwanese, and (6) economic development. The first three con the future of the island and American postwar interests; the three deal more precisely with fundamental problems of occu In some instances final solutions were postponed pending lat ordination with the allies, particularly the Chinese, or militar sions. The fundamental problems considered were essentially which the occupying civil affairs units expected to confront imm ately after conquest.
In spring, 1944, information reached Washington concernin activities of the "Taiwan Revolutionary League" and rumors effect that the Chinese Nationalists had formed a provisional gov ment for Taiwan in Chungking and were prepared to administ island as a separate province.28 While the Chinese governmen not expected to establish a "substate" or any other form of g ment prior to the end of the American occupation, some con arose, and the department's policy-makers emphatically stress importance of American pre-eminence.29 In their estimation, military weakness and lack of adequate naval forces made it likely" that China could force the surrender of Japanese for Taiwan. Consequently, it was recommended that even if J should suddenly capitulate-thus obviating conquest by Am military units-the United States should still effectuate the oc tion and establish a military government.30 This adamant pr to occupy Taiwan under any circumstances was based primarily military considerations rather than any future designs upon land, for it was clearly understood by the policy-makers that eignty, in accord with decisions reached at the Cairo confere would be returned to Taiwan.
Although the ultimate transfer of Taiwan's sovereignty t was not disputed, questions arose over the most appropriat to facilitate the transfer and its duration and timing. Mor "USDS, documents of the Area Committee on the Far East (CAC) and P Program Committee (PWC) (hereafter cited DS, CAC plus the appropriate n date. Changes and additions made by the PWC were incorporated into dr CAC, where the proposals originated. The most advanced version is the unless otherwise indicated), CAC-152, April 20, 1944 . ` DS, CAC-292, Sept. 27, 1944 Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, 31 became intricately involved in the character of the administration of the military government. In its review of the problem, CAC reasoned that it would be "politically advisable" to obtain the co-operation of the Chinese government in expediting the return of Taiwan to China and to co-ordinate American administrative policy with Chinese future plans for the island.3' Yet CAC recommended that "the sovereignty of Formosa will remain with Japan until such time as it is transferred to China by legal means." 32
This statement soon became the subject of some controversy in the State Department. During a meeting of the PWC on June 13, 1944, to consider policy for Taiwan, the legal adviser, Green H. Hackworth, had declared that an allied proclamation was all that was necessary to effect a legal transfer of the island to China. Two days later, Blakeslee and Joseph W. Ballantine, of the Far East division, expressed their concern over the "serious consequences" that might result from such action. The navy had anticipated and strongly desired to exercise supreme authority throughout the occupation period. To share any authority with China was considered potentially detrimental to the American mission in Taiwan.33 Moreover, the navy regarded any circumstance that could transfer sovereignty wholly or partially into Chinese hands as contrary to decisions made earlier regarding exclusive American responsibility for the occupa- to China." While accepting the proposed statement,36 Hackwo observed that the question might be raised "as to where soverei rests in the interim: in Japan, the United Nations, the United S or whether it is in suspense." At the time, he thought that it was important to decide. In later years, however, it was to become a issue, and this indecision resulted in a source of friction and disagr ment between the United States and Nationalist China.
The proposed revision of the questionable statement on sov eignty, as suggested by Blakeslee and Ballantine, was adopted w very minor alterations in a new draft of the CAC document.37 In cision on sovereignty, however, continued to be a source of disagr ment in the CAC. In early September another policy paper, reflectin concern over a premature transfer of sovereignty to Taiwan, w drawn up. It declared that "Chinese sovereignty will not be restor to Formosa until the conclusion of military government by United States." 38 Almost three weeks later, however, this paper revised completely, omitting any reference to the now controver sovereignty question, 39and the vague reference as earlier phrased by Blakeslee and Ballantine stood as the department's position.
Related to the sovereignty question was the timing of the transfer of governmental functions to the Chinese. This was to be accom plished only after the full sovereignty of Taiwan was restored China, and presumably this might be done en bloc. It was forese however, that "civil disturbances" on the mainland might delay b transfers.40 Consequently, termination of the occupation would decided at a later date by the State Department, but it was understoo that the occupation would continue so long as the transfer of sov eignty or governmental functions remained in abeyance.41 Thus, ' DS, Memorandum, Hackworth to Blakeslee and Ballantine, June 15, 1944 (894A.014/5) .
17 DS, CAC-161a (Draft 3), June 28, 1944.
38DS, CAC-292 (Prelim.), Sept. 7, 1944 . The statement further declared that "the Chinese Government will have no authority over governmental functions in Formosa during the period of military government and all Chinese personnel employed by the occupying forces will be under their sole authority." a DS, CAC-292 (rev. draft), Sept. 27, 1944 . 40 DS, CAC-177, May 15, 1944 4Ibid. An earlier draft, CAC-177 (Prelim. a), May 8, 1944 , suggested that, in the event of a delay in the transfer of sovereignty, "a joint control commission or some other form of complete civil affairs administration" might be established. While this statement and its subsequent deletion occurred before the controversy over the sovereignty issue which arose at the PWC meeting in June, it indicates that some policy-makers were willing to give the Chinese Nationalist government a voice in the proposed occupation, but others, whose opinions predominated, were hesitant, obviously distrustful, and preferred to delay in making firm commitments to China.
weakened character of the Nationalist government created uncertainty about the duration of American occupation plans. Another matter, closely related to long-range American interests, was the strategic value Taiwan would have for United States defensive measures in the western Pacific. The wisdom of establishing American bases there was discussed by Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins in mid-November, 1943, during preparatory talks for their meeting with Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo. Their discussion, however, was inconclusive; questions arose over Chiang's probable reception to the idea, and the President reasoned that he "would not agree to any permanent bases." 42 In later discussions at Teheran with Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary, and Vyacheslov Molotov, the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, Hopkins made note of United States interest in bases on Taiwan, but admitted that "the size, character, and duties of occupying forces on such bases would have to be worked out." 43 The question, however, apparently was not raised to the Generalissimo at this time.
In spring, 1944, when problems concerning Taiwan were rev by the area committee on the Far East, the question of bases given delicate consideration. The focus of the problem centered whether Taiwan would be returned to China with the understa that "a base or bases" would be given to the United States whether it would be for exclusive American use or to be oper jointly with China or collectively with other allied nations. The trol of the bases was an aspect of the issue which could not b swered at that time, but it was clear to the committee that traditional American policy toward China must be maintained to avoid generating resentment. A request for preferential treatment regarding bases, the CAC reasoned, would not be in accord with the Open Door policy, the Nine-Power Pact, and the Cairo Declaration which in no way placed limitations on the transfer of Taiwan to China. Being sensitive to China's "growing nationalism," the committee warned against infringing upon her sovereignty. Consequently, it was recommended that the question of bases be kept entirely separate from the transfer of sovereignty and that any effort to seek rights for bases "for general international security purposes" be considered after 4(Italics mine.) U.S. Foreign Relations, "The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943," 259. 4 Ibid., 570.
Taiwan was fully restored to Chinese sovereignty.44 Concern for tionalist China's response toward Western policies and intention postwar Asia clearly over-rode strategic considerations. Such v were a reflection of American plans to enhance China's status in world, despite its increasingly chaotic political structure.
In addition to questions closely allied to American strategic in ests in Taiwan, the CAC gave considerable attention to administr policy and related issues. The most salient administrative prob concerned the extent to which the Chinese Nationalist governm and Chinese personnel would be allowed to participate in the c affairs of the proposed occupation. In a general sense, the comm regarded Chinese co-operation both "helpful for the effective f tioning of the military administration of civil affairs" and "politic advisable," as well as useful in expediting the retrocession of Ta to China.45 Since the island's administration in both governmen industry was in the hands of the Japanese, and more than 90 cent of the population was Chinese, it was expected that the Ch segment of the population would rebel against co-operating w their former superiors.46 Furthermore, it was proposed that United States co-ordinate its occupation plans, "so far as milit considerations permit" and "give serious consideration" to t plans understood to be in preparation in Chungking and also to heed of "the wishes of the Formosan Revolutionist League.
While it was seen that seeking Chinese advice and participation politically astute, policy-makers cautioned against overexuberan this direction to "prevent unwelcome participation or interfere by the Chinese" and declared that "strict insistence on the excl responsibility and authority of the American military authoriti maintained." 48 Nevertheless, the drafters of this policy pape not believe it would be impossible "to co-operate along modera effective lines with the Chinese" in conducting a civil adminis 44 DS, CAC-152, April 20, 1944 . This was entirely in accord with publicized w of the Chinese (New York Times, May 16, 1943, 28:6) . U.S. Planning for Taiwan, 1942 Taiwan, -1945 tion.49 The State Department's main concern was that it did not wish to become obligated to accept Chinese advice which it might deem infeasible, and the department feared that an overzealous welcome to the Chinese to participate might lead them to expect that their views would automatically be accepted. Thus, it was recommended only that "Chinese advice be invited in determination of broad policy for planning." 50 A specific problem of Chinese participation centered upon whether a Chinese military mission should be invited to consult with the civil affairs government, and if so, whether it was desirable for the mission to accompany American assault waves against the island. The policymakers promptly realized that such an invitation "might result in a Chinese inference that their participation had been formalized and that they were to enjoy partnership rather than to be restricted to offering advice which might or might not be taken." Consequently, it was unequivocally recommended that no invitation be given for a military mission.51
Practical considerations impelled the State Department's policyplanners to advocate the utilization of Chinese personnel on the administrative staff of the military government. Principally on the assumption that Chinese forces would aid in the seizure of Taiwan, the CAC advocated that Chinese representation on the civil affairs staff have administrative and police functions.52 The committee was particularly desirous of recruiting Chinese personnel "skilled in financial and legal matters and in agriculture and industry who could assist American civil affairs officers with the formulation of plans for civil administration in Formosa." Chinese who were fam iar with Taiwan dialects would also be especially valuable.53 4 Ibid. It was further stated that "official Chinese plans for permanent governm tal reorganization should be given favorable consideration only to the extent that th meet the needs of the occupying authorities." O Ibid. Another aspect of the problem which perplexed the drafters of these pol proposals concerned the extent to which administrative acts would meet the ne of Taiwanese "interests" vis-A-vis the interests of the Chinese Nationalist governme It was finally recommended that "short-term administrative acts" should be made the occupation authorities to meet the requirements of Taiwanese interests, wh long-term operations, such as those concerned with the educational system, be ordinated with the Chinese. A strong stand in support of giving the interests of t Chinese Nationalists precedence over those of "local Formosan interests" in ear drafts of the study was deleted in the final (fourth) draft. Recruitment of Chinese personnel for the occupation govern would come from China, Taiwan, and from among Chinese na (students, officials, etc.) temporarily residing in the United S All Chinese considered for employment, policy planners e sized, would be hired only with the approval of the Chinese N ist government at Chungking. They would be utilized in pos requiring technical and professional skills, and "because of d ences between military government and Kuomintang points of vi it was recommended that the occupation authorities "avoid o staffing at the higher levels." 54 In several places throughou policy papers on Taiwan, the importance of retaining America dominance in all facets of the military government was stre Thus, while Chinese would participate in the occupation, the tivities would be limited to technical, low-level affairs.
Despite the antipathy of the Chinese toward the Japanese, consideration was given also to the utilization of Japanese nat who had served in judicial and lesser administrative posts du Taiwan's Japanese era. While it was determined that they cou be relied upon to deal equitably with the Taiwanese, some tions would be made for "certain Japanese peculiarly qualifie some particular duty." 55
In an effort to utilize existing institutions and to prevent n disruption of political life on Taiwan, it was proposed tha administrative organizations, including the established legal ture, be retained. Tax laws and the existing private law,56 for exa would continue and be administered by local courts; but mili proclamations would take precedence over existing law. Certai crepancies, such as tax laws favoring Japanese against Taiwan would be discontinued.57 Continuity and impartiality was to g administrative policies.
The half-century occupation of Taiwan by Japan posed leg practical problems concerning the status of the major ethnic g on the island. While the committee suggested that no def " DS, CAC-177, May 15, 1944. m5Ibid. DS, CAC-153a, June 28, 1944. 5 According to international practice, a nation which is the recipient of terr sovereignty customarily continues the existing revenue system and the est private law of that territory. It was anticipated that the Chinese Nationalist g ment would adhere to this practice and make appropriate changes only in law. American concern for local institutions had precedence in Japan's occupa policy concerning the postwar disposition of Japanese could be formulated,58 it recommended that a mass segregation or removal of Japanese civilians would be inadvisable, except in clear cases where military security would be involved. The view maintained by the department's policy-makers was to permit the Japanese themselves free choice in determining whether to remain in Taiwan or return to Japan.59
The question concerning the status of the Japanese led to consideration of the status of other ethnic groups on Taiwan. The State Department regarded the Taiwanese (i.e., "Chinese Formosans") and the mountain aborigines "quite apart" from the Japanese and anticipated that the Taiwanese, whether ethnically pure or of mixed origin, would ultimately regain Chinese citizenship after the war.60 Consequently, the CAC felt that they could hardly be considered "enemy nationals" but rather "liberated peoples." This was deemed advisable for both political and practical reasons. It was envisioned that the distinction would hasten the "de-Japanization" of those who would once again become Chinese nationals and would encourage them to co-operate with the occupation.6' The economy of Taiwan was recognized as a serious problem for the postwar era, both because of the questions it raised about the disposition of Japanese property and currency-related matters and the effect that the severance of Taiwan would have upon the economy of Japan proper. The latter concern was disposed of rather quickly. While Taiwan and other Japanese dependencies were relied on as sources of raw materials and food products and for their market and investment value, the department's evaluation contended that they were of limited importance in terms of real wealth that had contributed materially to the economic development of Japan.62 Rice was a major Japanese import from Taiwan, but largely because of preference for the type of rice grown there; sugar was another plentiful Taiwan product, but Japan could have purchased it from Java for about half the price. The value of Taiwan to Japan was primarily strategic, rather than economic. 58 DS, CAC-187, May 11, 1944 . It was understood that policy concerning the disposition of Japanese would be determined by the Chinese government when sovereignty was restored to China. Moreover, repatriation of Japanese from all formerly occupied areas was considered a problem for international action after the war. Before the disposition of Japanese property could be determ it was necessary to define the difference between private and p property and to decide the extent to which China would becom volved in expropriation plans. To insure greater control over as a share of Japanese property as possible, it was recommended private property be "strictly defined" and public property "br defined." Thus, the concept of public property would include s official companies and private organizations which received la scale government assistance,63 enabling the military governme confiscate property only semi-public in character if it contributed the Japanese war effort. It was further established that the mi government would act as "custodian" for Japanese property an vestments in Taiwan64 and that it would abide by the Hague Co tion Rules which disallow the confiscation of private property.65
Despite the narrow interpretation given to private propert constituted a large amount of diverse enterprises. Although pr holdings in public utilities, railroads, mines, and other indust could be given "public" treatment on grounds that they contrib to the Japanese war effort, there were many less strategic enterp (hotels, barber shops, retail stores, professional offices) which be treated leniently. The property involved and the Japanese pe nel owning and operating these businesses would be protect Concern was expressed primarily about a rumored Chinese inte to seize and confiscate the bulk of Japanese private property in wan and other occupied areas of China without adequate comp tion. Chinese seizure of such property, it was believed, would tantamount to forced liquidation, and the owners would unde loss no different than if the property were initially expropriated.
issue posed a dilemma for the policy-planners, because they re that any effort to prevent China from expropriating Japanese pri and public property "would almost certainly be strongly rese and might be a source of serious trouble" with China.67
The disposition of public property allowed greater freedom decision and posed less of a perplexing diplomatic problem fo 0 DS, CAC-197 (Prelim.), May 19, 1944 . 8 DS, CAC-178, May 11, 1944 . " DS, CAC-157, April 26, 1944 DS, CAC-156, May 11, 1944 . "6 DS, CAC-156, May 11, 1944 , May 19, 1944 . At the conclusion of the war, all Jap assets in liberated areas and in other areas under the jurisdiction of the allied were immediately immobilized. DS, USDS to embassy, Chungking (Tel. no.
Aug. 28, 1945 (800.515). military government. There were considered to be three categories of public property: properties belonging to the Japanese Government-General of Taiwan, such as cash, securities, and railroad rolling stock, which could be confiscated for use by the occupation forces; quasi-official companies, such as the Taiwan Electric Power Company, the Taiwan Development Company, and the Bank of Taiwan; and the Imperial Household properties."8 Disposition of these enterprises would depend upon their character and wartime use which would determine whether or not confiscation would be appropriate.
The problem caused by the definition and disposition of property found solution in international practice, but the important financial question of currency was governed primarily by contemporary mainland conditions. Since Chinese currency was then greatly depreciated, and no economic, political, or military grounds required the adoption of Chinese currency, the area committee recommended that a stable medium be established, wholly independent of Chinese currency. The question of Taiwan's currency greatly concerned the Chinese. In the summer of 1945 they communicated with the American Embassy in Chungking, revealing extensive fiscal plans with respect to Taiwan and inquiring broadly about American invasion and occupation plans.69 The Americans, however, played the same game of attempting to learn about Chinese plans without revealing their own.70 '"DS, CAC-162, May 9, 1944 . The Imperial Household properties posed a question because of their anomalous character. In Japan they consisted of many things, including estates, cash, securities, etc., but in Taiwan the Imperial Household held part share only in the Taiwan Sugar Co. and the Bank of Taiwan. Rather than single out these companies, the policy-planners merely enumerated reasons for which Imperial holdings might be considered private property or public property. * The Chinese informed the United States that they had prepared a bank commission, consisting of senior officers from the Ministry of Finance, the four government banks, the Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, and the Central Trust Co. "to take over monetary and banking affairs in Formosa." Among fourteen groups of questions asked about banking and other matters pertaining to the impending invasion was this one: "When might be the prospective time of invasion to Formosa? Of course, you can only conjecture on it, but your guess might be a good hint...." (DS, Hoo Leng Lin, Bank of Communications, Chungking, to Walter S. Robertson, U.S. Minister, Chungking, June 27, 1945 [800] . Unexplained is the date on which the communication was received at the embassy: Aug. 11, 1945. As would be expected, the embassy gave the letter a cool reception and promptly replied: "You have raised many interesting questions, which we are not in a position to answer..." (DS, U.S. Treasury Attach6, Chungking, to Hoo Leng Lin, Aug. 11, 1945 [800] ).
7 In Sept., 1945, USDS wired the U.S. Embassy in Chungking requesting information about Chinese financial plans for Taiwan but cautioned "you should not (repeat not) discuss this with Chinese authorities at this time" (DS, USDS to U.S. Embassy, Chungking, Sept. 4, 1945 [Tel. 1390 .515]).
In anticipation of private trade between Taiwan and the ma during the occupation, a foreign exchange value was to be d mined and controlled so that emphasis would be given to main the stability of the island's economy.71 Despite this restrain wan's integration with the mainland was foreseen. The island plus rice crop,72 it was anticipated, would be welcomed in K tung and adjacent provinces as part of a war-relief effort in East which military administrations would initially conduct.73
One economic problem which was recognized as potentially ing "an important role in the future economic development Far East" but which was postponed for Taiwan was that o reform. The State Department foresaw the need for such a pro but it was then reasoned that a foreign power, engaged in a temp occupation, was not entitled under international law "to insti program of land reform involving forced transfers of owners tenancy rights." 74 In addition to the provisional nature of th tary government, sensitivity to Chinese Nationalist preferenc have been more of a restraining factor than international practic After the area committee for the Far East had complet study of occupation plans for Taiwan and other eastern and sou Asian areas under Japanese jurisdiction, the Chinese Natio government, knowing that such plans were being formulate came very inquisitive about their character. The State Depar had been informed in late summer, 1944, that Chiang Kai-she sired a three-power conference (with the United States and Britain) to discuss administrative plans for liberated areas,7' b department was firmly opposed to releasing this information for sons of military security and advised the Chinese only about over-all policy for civil affairs administration." The Chinese reassured, however, that American military administration in nese occupied areas would only be "temporary and entirely wi prejudice to the future status of the area" and that civil affai 71DS, CAC-166 (Prelim. a), April 26, 1944. 7 While sugar was an important Taiwan crop, it was not significant in the diet. Tea was neither essential nor underproduced; bananas and canned fru some limited use in China. 73 DS, CAC-159, April 15, 1944 . 7 DS, CAC-173, May 5, 1944 (may not be final draft). 75 Later it was revealed that Chiang had not called for a three-power conferen had instructed his foreign minister to seek a "written understanding" with the States and Great Britain concerning civil administration in the liberated areas. American ambassador in Chungking had reasoned that Chiang wished to mak in such an agreement that the civil administration be transferred to national au ministration would be transferred to Chinese government authority "as soon as the military situation permits." 76
In October, 1944, the department was informed that specific interest was developing in China about the future disposition of Taiwan. An investigatory body was organized in China called the "Formosa Problems Investigation Committee," under the aegis of the Central Planning Board.77 It was made up of eleven members and included Ch'en Yi, committee chairman (and first postwar governor of Tai Reports circulating in Chungking indicated that the Taiwanese were anxious to end Japanese rule and would welcome an American occupation. There were also reports, however, that the population was reluctant to accept Chinese governmental control from the mainland and that "a large section of the Formosan populace" was "deties rather than local authorities. It was presumed that the foreign minister merely seized upon the opportunity when approaching the United States to request a conference of broad scope. DS, U.S. Embassy, Chungking, to USDS, Sept. 19, 1944 (Tel. 1581, 800.0146).
76 This sentiment was inspired by the joint chiefs of staff which would not have objected to a civil affairs agreement so long as it made no reference to specific areas, was limited to military affairs, and prepared on a military level. DS, USDS to U.S. Embassy, Chungking, Sept. 2, 1944 (Tel. 1166 , 800.0146), idem. to idem., Sept. 16, 1944 (Tel. 1219 .
"This board came under the control of the Supreme National Defense Council (a directive organ of the Kuomintang) and formulated and reviewed political and economic plans. The committee for Taiwan was one of two (the other concerning Manchuria) established to develop plans for governing the island. It is of curious interest that news about the creation of this committee, which was transmitted by Ambassador Gauss in Oct., 1944, was reported in the New York Times in April and obtained from a radio broadcast from Chungking "beamed to North America" in English (New York Times, April 23, 1944, 28:2) . The Chinese obviously wanted policy-planners in Washington to know about their intentions concerning Taiwan; yet Gauss apparently did not take them seriously at the time.
78 The four principal members were Ch'en Yi, dean of the Central Training Corps and former chairman of the Fukien provincial government, who was made chairman of the committee (not to be confused with the former military commander of the same name who became minister of foreign affairs at Peking in 1958); General Wang P'engsheng, advisor to Chiang Kai-shek on Japanese affairs; Hsieh Nan-kuang, then closely associated with General Wang and a section chief in the Chinese Military Affairs sirous of establishing an independent state or at the very leas preserving local autonomy." 80 This sentiment, reported one y before Taiwan was liberated, was to have telling repercussions d ing the early phase of Chinese Nationalist administration." Inf mation about political leanings among the Taiwanese was gathe in Chungking by Hsieh Nan-kuang, a member of the "Form Problems Investigation Committee" and considered an "expert Taiwan, though having last been there in 1931. Hsieh elaborate the reports of anti-Japanese sentiment and discussed the natur underground political parties.82 Such information was of valu the proposed American military government for Taiwan, and which was received from the Chinese Nationalist government Chungking was apparently the only insight into the island's pol make-up at the time.
Shortly after the American occupation program for Taiwan completed in late spring, 1944, military plans for the defe Japan underwent more intensive re-examination. Military str gists focused upon the most rapid and economical way to subd Japan.83 Defeat of the enemy, it was envisioned, might be ac plished by naval blockade and air bombardment. Advance bases, established on Taiwan and the China coast, were regarde essential to accomplish this strategy and would also be require invasion of the Japanese home islands proved necessary. Milit planners regarded a triangular area established by the China c Taiwan, and the northern-most Philippine island of Luzon as t prime target.s4 A prolonged dispute developed between a larg naval preference, first upheld by military planners, for a cen Pacific thrust toward Taiwan and General Douglas MacArth so Ibid.
s In 1947 the Taiwan populace openly rebelled against the government, but was suppressed by military force. s2DS, Gauss, Chungking, to Secretary of State, Desp. 3042, Oct. 9, 1944 (894A.00) . Kerr (Formosa Betrayed, 14, [46] [47] regards Hsieh Nan-kuang as an opportunist whose reports on growing Taiwanese discontent were highly exaggerated. If this is true, Intelligence officers at the U.S. Embassy in Chungking seemed to be unaware of it.
8SThe military aspects of the Pacific war and the controversy over Taiwan have been discussed in numerous accounts. For detailed and authoritative studies, see Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943 -1944 (Washin D.C., 1959 and Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 6-17. " Naval Records, CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Joint Staff Study: Formosa-Amoy (Pr (Serial: 00078), June 21, 1944, CAUSEWAY (code name for the Taiwan operat Naval planners, however, soon voiced their opinion that the air force in "the sou PHILIPPINES will support the capture of FORMOSA by neutralizing Japanese in the northern PHILIPPINES to an extent which makes the capture of LUZO prior to the move on FORMOSA unnecessary." U.S. Planning for Taiwan, 1942 Taiwan, -1945 urging of an approach from the Southwest Pacific that would place stress upon conquest of the Philippines. Control of the triangle was to be accomplished by the spring of 1945.85 While public discussion of this controversial strategy never became commonplace,86 it received considerable attention by military strategists, both in Washington and the Pacific area, during the latter half of 1944. In March of that year, MacArthur had been directed to prepare for an invasion of the southern Philippines with February, 1945, as a target date for Luzon. Taiwan was to be invaded at the same time. In mid-June the joint chiefs of staff questioned the feasibility of the Luzon attack. MacArthur, however, firmly upheld the plan as an essential one before military forces could move against Japan. His reasoning was both moral and strategic. American prestige was dependent upon his promised return, and Taiwan's heavy fortifications and its distance from adequate logistical support made an assault upon the island particularly hazardous.87 Luzon, he thought, would more effectively sever Japan's communication to the south and would provide a better position from which to strike farther north.88 prompted General Marshall to caution him to constrain his per feelings about the Philippines and noted that "by-passing" was way synonymous with "abandonment" and that the sooner J could be defeated the quicker the Philippines would be liberat This objective dominated strategic planning in Washington, b problem developed over which course to take-a certain but sl and more costly route through the Philippines, Taiwan, an Ryukyus, or a faster but more hazardous route via the Bonin Is A final decision would depend upon the early defeat of the Jap and German navies.91
Meanwhile, in early July, MacArthur began to clash directly wi Admiral Nimitz who defended the Taiwan operation, but with som what less tenacity than MacArthur defended the Luzon plan. Whi Nimitz conceded the importance of land-based air support, such Luzon would provide for an assault against Taiwan, he maintaine the navy view that "neutralization" of the Japanese air force the from the southern Philippines, along with naval supremacy in t , 1943-1944, 480 481.
to the naval plan for the seizure of only the southern tip of Ta and a simultaneous assault against the Chinese coastal port of A This contained the risk, however, of incessant Japanese attack the remainder of enemy units on the island, necessitating an mate effort to conquer all of it. MacArthur regarded this as a p ous course.96 By mid-September the apparent cost in men and teriel, the scarcity of required service groups, and the persuasiv of MacArthur weighed heavily in turning the joint chiefs of away from the Nimitz-King emphasis on Taiwan.97 A dec whether to attack Taiwan or Luzon first depended upon reinf ments that might be received as a result of the cessation of hostili in Europe-relief that did not appear immediately forthcomin September, 1944.98 The strategic importance of Amoy was to channel supplies to bases in eastern China from which bombing missions could be against Japan, but a successful Japanese offensive against these in September negated the need for the port. Consequently, Ta became less urgent. The island itself had little to offer in the w logistical naval bases, and it could no longer play the role of a toward the mainland.99 As evidenced mounted against the feasib of assaulting Taiwan, navy planners, including Admiral Nimitz self, proposed by-passing it and proceeding northward-bringin navy more in accord with MacArthur's sentiments.100 29, 1944; 98While the time schedule for the invasion of either of these islands dep partly upon logistics from Europe, progress in the Pacific War was equally impo With success of the latter, MacArthur proposed to advance the assault dates Philippines and Taiwan (i.e., Leyte, Oct. 20, 1944; Luzon, Dec. 20, 1944; Taiwa possibly Feb. 20, 1945) and again emphasized the importance and logical progr of invading Luzon before Taiwan (Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 10).
" At this point the navy began to re-examine its objectives in the CAUSE operation and considered the substitution of Iwo Jima and Okinawa for Amoy. Records: Ltr., CINCPOA to Comm., 5th Fleet, Comm. Gen., 10th Army, Amph Forces, Pac. Fleet (Serial: 000113), Sept. 16, 1944 (CINCPAC File: A16/Cs).
100Nimitz, who was also concerned about recent reports of enemy troop incr in Taiwan, believed that it was "now impossible" to effectuate the plan and thou
In early October, an advance group of eighty Chinese offic arrived in Taiwan to establish Chinese administration that would be led by Governor Ch'en Yi,107 who had earlier headed the Ta committee to plan a postwar program for the island. On Octobe 1945, a ceremony took place restoring Chinese rule in Taiwan ending a full half century of Japanese colonization.
Despite the decisive end to American plans for an occupatio Taiwan, the new Chinese administration was observed with gr misgivings. Before the end of 1945 reports of growing resentm by the population toward the Chinese administration were mad Washington.'s0 Less than two years later Major General Alber Wedemeyer clearly confirmed the rumored corruption of Ta governor, Ch'en Yi. 109 The significance of this episode in American policy planning regard to China is twofold: in its narrow scope, the origins of major postwar problems concerning Taiwan are clearly reveal its broad context, official State Department views toward the Chin Nationalist government and its anticipated association with it c discerned.
Three problems considered by the State Department in spring, 1944, became prominent postwar issues: (1) The question of Taiwan's legal status, after some controversy, was held in abeyance due to the department's reluctance to transfer sovereignty to the Nationalist government while the United States administered its occupation.
Though intended to be brief, delay of the transference of sovereignty to China has persisted to this day, but for other reasons. The United States holds that the Nationalist government occupies Taiwan in condominium for the wartime allies. Not to maintain this position would reopen the question of which Chinese government has a rightful claim to Taiwan and would raise the dormant issues of the pro-
